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                                                            Abstract     
 
This study takes steps towards developing behavioral principle-based board process as 
success dimension to effective board role performance. In the literature, dominant 
corporate governance research that centered on rule-based board structure has so far 
yielded conflicting and ambiguous results. These could not transform effective corporate 
functioning, thus inconclusive. This study also stimulates debates about the extension of 
corporate governance literature in the stakeholder theoretical perspective, which 
incorporates both shareholders and non-shareholding stakeholders, as a comprehensible 
preference to the traditionally dominant agency model in an attempt to offer a more 
inclusive approach and strengthen the existing governance structure in Nigeria. This 
suggests having employee representatives and creditor seats on board to participate in 
firm’s top decisions. The study also examines factors responsible for reported weak 
enforcement in relations to board performance, with the broad objective of investigating 
if the combination of these factors constitute effective corporate governance and explain 
board performance. Based on survey perceptions of 154 respondents from the Nigerian 
capital market sampled participants, the study employs confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) in a structural equation modeling (SEM) approach. Thus, a model that relates 
board process and three stakeholders constructs to board performance is proposed. 
Building upon board process dimensions such as cognitive conflict, effort norms, use of 
knowledge and skills, and groupthink; this study finds that board process is significantly 
related to board performance. In addition, building upon the three stakeholder 
constructs, this study also finds creditor participation to be significantly related to board 
performance. However, employee participation and regulatory enforcement show 
insignificant relationship with board performance. The study concludes that combination 
of board process and creditor participation constitutes effective corporate governance. 
 
 
 
Keywords: corporate governance, board process, board performance, contractual 
stakeholders, enforcement. 
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                                                                  Abstrak 
 
    
Kajian ini bertujuan meningkatkan gelagat lembaga pengarah berasaskan prinsip sebagai 
dimensi kejayaan dalam memainkan peranan lembaga pengarah secara efektif. Ini 
memandangkan kebanyakan penyelidikan dalam bidang tadbir urus korporat yang 
bertumpu kepada pemboleh ubah lembaga pengarah berasaskan peraturan bercanggah 
dan  mengelirukan. Keputusan ini juga tidak dapat menghasilkan perubahan fungsi 
korporat secara efektif. Kajian ini juga akan merangsang pembahasan mengenai tadbir 
urus korporat dari perspektif teori pihak berkepentingan, yang menggabungkan kedua 
pemegang saham dan pihak berkepentingan bukan-pemegang saham, sebagai alternatif 
kepada teori agensi yang secara tradisinya dikuasai oleh model Anglo-Saxon. Ini sebagai 
usaha untuk menawarkan pendekatan yang lebih terangkum dan mengukuhkan struktur 
tadbir urus yang sedia ada di Nigeria. Kajian ini mencadangkan lembaga pengarah 
penasihatan perlu dianggotai oleh wakil pekerja dan pemiutang dalam membuat 
keputusan peringkat atasan. Kajian ini juga mengkaji faktor-faktor yang dapat mengatasi 
penguatkuasaan yang lemah berkaitan prestasi lembaga pengarah. Kaji selidik persepsi 
terhadap 154 responden ahli pasaran modal Nigeria ini menggunakan analisis faktor 
pengesahan (CFA) dalam pendekatan Model Struktur  Persamaan  (SEM). Dalam model 
ini, proses lembaga pengarah dan tiga konstruk pihak berkepentingan kepada prestasi 
lembaga adalah dicadangkan. Berdasarkan konstruk proses lembaga pengarah seperti 
konflik kognitif, norma-norma usaha, penggunaan pengetahuan dan kemahiran, dan 
pemikiran berkumpulan, kajian ini mendapati bahawa perkara-perkara yang diukur 
dalam konstruk ini mempunyai hubungan signifikan dengan prestasi lembaga pengarah. 
Di samping itu, berdasarkan tiga kontruk pihak berkepentingan, kajian ini juga 
mendapati penyertaan pemiutang adalah signifikan kepada prestasi lembaga pengarah. 
Walaubagaimanapun, penyertaan pekerja dan penguatkuasaan tidak memberi hubungan 
yang signifikan. Kajian ini menyimpulkan bahawa proses lembaga pengarah dan 
penyertaan pemiutang menyumbang kepada tadbir urus yang efektif dan dapat memberi 
kesan kepada prestasi  lembaga pengarah 
 
 
 
Kata Kunci: tadbir urus korporat, proses lembaga pengarah, prestasi lembaga pengarah, 
pihak berkepentingan kontraktual, penguatkuasaan 
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                                                            Chapter One  
                                                    Introduction 
 
1.1 Background of the Research 
 
In the contemporary period, large corporations have emerged because of capital market 
integration that necessitates separating wealth owners from the control of their firms. 
Hence, investors in US can own large stakes in Asian and African corporations and vice 
versa without having to travel to the investing environments and skilled labor can be 
out-sourced across borders, making the entire world a global village. In this regard, vast 
literature on corporate governance have been documented, with focus mainly on outside 
shareholder protection, thus governance rules, which had thrived for centuries, seem to 
continue in the realms of contemporary literature in many different perspectives. 
 
The dominant theory in the shareholder-oriented governance is the principal-agent 
model, which regards the central problem of corporate governance as self-interested 
managerial behavior, when the agent does not share the principal’s objectives (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Gupta, Otley & Young, 2008; and Rashidah & 
Mohammad Rizal, 2010). They affirm that, managers of corporations who influence the 
firm’s decisions may act selfish at the detriment of the outside investors, and it is 
difficult for the principal to verify their agents’ integrity, which results in agency 
problems. In this respect, advocates of the Anglo-American governance arrangement 
identify the need to provide the outside investors with adequate protection. As a result, 
when principals attempt to ensure that agents act in their invested interests, agency cost 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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